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ABSTRACT 
 
Exploring the Phenomena of Inner Experience with  
Descriptive Experience Sampling  
 
by 
 
Janell M. Mihelic 
 
Dr. Christopher Heavey, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 This study provides a survey of the phenomena of normal, everyday inner 
experience using the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) method. Results 
demonstrated that five types of inner experience (sensory awareness, feeling, 
unsymbolized thinking, inner seeing, and inner speech) occurred in approximately one-
quarter of sampled moments and that there were significant individual differences 
regarding the frequency with which subjects experienced these phenomena. Three new 
dimensions (richness of inner experience, the number of experiences present, and the 
overall valence of the experience) along which inner experience could be characterized 
were identified and used reliably to characterize moments of experience.  Finally, 
although there was some agreement in subject and interviewer perceptions of the ability 
to capture and report experience, it was determined that these ratings could not be used to 
determine the fidelity of reports or descriptions of inner experience.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 A professor stands in front of a packed, 200-person lecture hall teaching the 
principles of psychology and wonders to herself: What is going on through the minds of 
the students in this class? Is anyone paying attention? An audience watches American 
Idol contestants attempt to woo the judges with their talents and become a final 
contestant. As viewers watch the tryouts, some may wonder: What is going on through 
contestants’ minds? Over a century of psychological debate has focused on 
understanding the characteristics of inner experience; however, to date, psychology 
knows surprisingly little about the nature or details of inner experience.  
Psychology, at its inception, set out to understand and describe people’s internal 
worlds using introspection, a method of studying an observing subject looking within 
his/her internal states (Boring, 1953). Despite their attempts, early introspective 
investigators largely relied upon theoretical inferences, focused on the psychophysical 
aspects of experience, and only included subjects who had practiced introspection 
approximately 10,000 times before being used in published studies (Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2004; Boring, 1953).  
The American introspectionists at Cornell University and the German 
introspectionists at the Würzburg school were two prominent groups of psychologists 
using early introspective techniques. For over 20 years, these two groups of researchers 
feuded over the characteristics of inner experience, especially regarding the existence of 
imageless thought (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Meanwhile behaviorism took center stage 
as the new branch of psychology whose agenda for studying human psyche was 
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diametrically opposite to that of introspective investigators. Behaviorism pushed for the 
study of overt and observable behaviors and criticized introspective methods for their 
focus on mental activities and subjective reports. Behaviorism changed the research 
method away from the subject’s being the observer of his/her own experiences to the 
investigator’s being the observer of the subject (Boring, 1953). The lack of agreement 
about phenomena of inner experience and the rise of behaviorism left the task of 
discovering the characteristics of inner experience unfinished (Danziger, 1980). 
After a prolonged disappearance, the past 30 years has seen a resurgence of 
interest in inner experience. This resurgence is partly because there was a realization that 
the accounts of human functioning that relied solely on behavioral principles were 
incomplete. Despite psychology’s current interest and early efforts aimed at the 
exploration of inner experience, we still do not have a clear understanding of day-to-day 
inner experience: What is it like? Is everyone’s inner experience the same?   
The present study attempted these questions by evaluating the characteristics of 
normal, everyday inner experience. This study will use the Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES) method developed by Hurlburt (1990, 1993). DES is an introspective 
technique distinct from the methods used at the inception of psychology (Hurlburt & 
Heavey, 2004). DES is a descriptive and idiographic method aimed at exploring and 
describing inner experiences. DES is a bottom-up technique that involves faithfully 
describing a single experience and working up to portraying aspects of a single person 
based upon multiple single experiences (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). DES has been used 
successfully to investigate a collection of subjects having in common one specific feature 
(e.g., an external characteristic or psychiatric diagnosis) in which a collection of 
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idiographic reports are examined to discover any salient characteristics that emerge 
across the collected group, providing nomothetic data (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  
The present study is similar to Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) which also examined 
the phenomena of inner experience in a sample of college students. Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008) used the DES method to investigate the phenomena of inner experience within 
and across 30-undergraduate students. They found five phenomena (inner speech, inner 
seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness) that occurred quite 
frequently (22% or more) in their sample. Most subjects had one dominant form of inner 
experience with the most common phenomenon being inner seeing. Moreover, their study 
revealed that there were often large differences in the frequency of the phenomena 
experienced by subjects. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) also compared inner experience 
phenomena with subject’s self-reported psychological distress on the Symptom Checklist 
90 Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1992). The correlations were generally small with the 
only significant correlation being between inner speech and psychological distress 
(negatively). 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate further the characteristics of 
inner experience. Similar to Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), this study investigated the 
relative frequency of the phenomena of inner experience previously identified (Hurlburt, 
1990, 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). This study also 
examined the degree to which there are individual differences in inner experience and set 
out to identify other meaningful dimensions along which inner experience could be 
characterized. Lastly, this study examined perceptions of the degree to which subjects 
could to capture, describe and understand inner experience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Modern Methods of Exploring Inner Experience 
Questionnaires 
In 1883, Galton created a questionnaire to assess subjects’ mental imagery 
(Klinger, 1978). Since then, a multitude of questionnaires have been developed to study 
aspects of inner experience. Questionnaires consist of a series of questions and/or other 
prompts for the purpose of gathering information from subjects.  
 For example, Pekala and Levine (1981) designed a 53-item questionnaire called 
the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) to evaluate characteristics of inner 
experience. The PCI has 12 major subdimensions: state of awareness, altered experience, 
volitional control, self-awareness, rationality, internal dialogue, positive affect, negative 
affect, imagery, attention, memory, and arousal (Pekala, 1982). Subjects rate the 53-items 
on a 7-point Likert scale. The PCI has been used primarily to study hypnosis and the 
changes in internal states such as differences between meditative and non-meditative 
states. Studies that have used the PCI have identified differences in perception and 
meaning between meditative and non-meditative states of consciousness (Venkatesh, 
Raju, Shivani, Tompkins, & Meti, 1997). Moreover, differences in imagery, vividness, 
self-awareness, and arousal were found between the meditative and non-meditative states 
(Venkatesh, Raju, Shivani, Tompkins, & Meti, 1997). When compared with self-report 
measures of creativity, PCI results were correlated with reported creativity, positive 
affect, attention to internal processes, visual imagery, and subjective trance depth 
experienced during hypnosis (Angelini, Kumar, & Chandler, 1999; Kumar et al., 1996).  
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Questionnaires are advantageous as they are usually easy to administer, time 
efficient, and yield quantitative data which may be more easily interpreted than open-
ended techniques which often require subjective analyses. Questionnaires are also 
advantageous as they place minimal demands on subjects. 
Despite the ease in which questionnaires can be used and their popularity in 
exploring experiences, questionnaires can be fallible in their ability to obtain a pure, 
accurate, unbiased account of a subject’s experience. Minor changes to question’s 
wording, format, or context can result in unexpected alterations in results. For example, 
Schwarz (1990) evaluated how questionnaire response alternatives can alter subjects’ 
reports. Subjects completed a questionnaire pertaining to how many hours they watch 
television each day. The two conditions had different multiple choice options to the same 
questions. In one condition, the questionnaire’s multiple choices incorporated low-
frequency response alternatives; in this condition only 16.2% of subjects reported 
watching television as much as two and one-half hours per day. The second condition 
incorporated a questionnaire with high-frequency response alternatives; in this condition 
37.5% of subjects reported watching television as much as two and one-half hours per 
day.  
 Two studies by Norenzayan and Schwarz (1999; 2006) also assessed changes in 
questionnaire results after changing one word on a questionnaire. Norenzayan and 
Schwarz (2006) instructed subjects to answer 20 open-ended “I am …” statements 
printed on either “Institute of Political Research” or “Institute of Psychological Research” 
letterhead. Results showed a significant difference in the frequency of social aspects 
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reported on the questionnaire printed on the “Institute of Political Research” letterhead 
(25% as compared to 15%).  
 Questionnaires can also be fallible because of subjects’ retrospective mistakes. 
Human memory is fragile and powerfully affected by the time lapse between the event 
and its recall with larger lapses being associated with greater loss or distortion of 
information (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Schwarz, 1990). 
Autobiographical memory, or a subject’s personal representation of specific events or 
personal facts, continues to decay after an event with specific thoughts pertaining to the 
event decaying most rapidly (Brewer, 1988). Robinson (1976) found that life events can 
alter the accessibility of memories suggesting any account of subjective experience 
should be recorded as close as possible to its actual occurrence.  
 Misrepresentations of experience can also be made when subjects answer 
frequency questions such as how many times they engage in a specific behavior. When 
asked a frequency related question, most subjects do not think back and count the number 
of times they engaged in the target behavior. Rather, subjects often employ a fragment of 
recall and use inference to compute frequency estimations (Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 
1987). Sudman and Schwarz (1989) studied subjects’ methods of answering frequency 
questions. Subjects were asked the following question: “how many sticks of deodorant 
did you buy in the last six months?” Results concurred with Bradburn, Rips, and 
Shevell’s (1987) finding that the majority of subjects did not use a recall and count 
method to answer the question, but rather estimated their responses by remembering a 
single event of the behavior and extrapolated from that incident to the rest of the time 
period in question. 
 7 
 
 This research, taken as a whole, indicates that questionnaires have many 
advantages such as they can be easily administered, they are time efficient, and they place 
minimal demands on subjects. However, questionnaires can easily result in a 
misrepresentation of a subject’s experience due to wording effects, memory errors caused 
by retrospective or other failings of memory, or the use of heuristics or other potentially 
biased strategies for answering questions. Given the substantial vulnerability of 
questionnaires to misrepresent or other sources of bias, the ability of this method to 
obtain a pure, accurate, and unbiased account of a subject’s experience is doubtful. 
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) 
 The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is another method of studying inner 
experience. ESM was developed to understand the relationship of inner experiences, 
behaviors, and situational variables within subjects’ natural environments 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larsen, 1987; Hormuth, 1986). ESM uses signaling devices such as 
pagers, programmable wrist watches, or telephones to alert subjects at quasi-random 
intervals. In response to the signal, subjects complete a questionnaire pertaining to their 
current experience (e.g., mood, affect, activities, etc). The content of the questionnaire 
differs based on the investigator’s interests; however, most questionnaires include 
questions pertaining to the subject’s social context, location, time of the signal as well as 
his/her current affect, and cognitions. In general, ESM aims to obtain an understanding of 
subjects’ internal and external states at the moment of each signal. 
 ESM has been used to investigate a multitude of inner experiences and how they 
relate to situational variables (Hormuth, 1986). In terms of inner experiences, ESM has 
been used to explore subjects’ mood, cognitions, and affects. ESM has investigated 
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gender differences (Graef, 1979), inner experiences of individuals with schizophrenia 
(Kimhy, Delespaul, Corcoran, Ahn, Yale, and Malaspina, 2007; Delespaul, 1995), 
adolescents as they emerge through puberty (Savin-Williams & Jaquish, 1981), the 
affects of mothers’ with infants (Wells, 1988), clusters of emotions within families 
(Larson & Richards, 1994), differences in positive and negative emotional experiences 
among culturally-different subjects (Scollon, Diner, Oishi, & Biswas-Diner, 2004) among 
others. 
ESM can be completed in two ways. Traditionally, a paper-and-pencil technique 
is used in which subjects complete a paper questionnaire at the moment of a signal or 
interval. The paper-and-pencil method is cost efficient and can be administered to a large 
number of subjects with minimal risk of subjects’ losing or damaging laboratory 
equipment. On the other hand, the paper-and-pencil method does not allow investigators 
to randomize presentation of items on the questionnaires, lacks the ability to extract 
compliance data, increases data management demands, and increases human error in data 
entry. More recently, ESM has replaced the paper questionnaires with computerized 
technologies, such as handheld electronic devices or Palm Pilots, on which subjects 
complete their questionnaires. Using electronic devices allows the time in which subjects 
complete the questionnaire to be recorded and thus yields compliance data. Furthermore, 
computerized devices are advantageous as they allow for precisely controlled timing, 
randomization of item presentation, and reduce human error. Using electronic devices 
also increases the likelihood of timely reporting (Barrett & Barrett, 2001). Disadvantages 
of electronic devices include possible programming complications, additional setup and 
maintenance, possible loss of data as a result of electronic malfunctions, and increased 
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cost associated with purchasing the electronic devices (Stone, Kessler, & 
Haythornthwaite, 1991).  
ESM provides many advantages. ESM reduces reliance on memory as subjects 
report their current experience at the moment of the signal. ESM can be used in single 
case studies, yielding idiographic results, and also with a large number of individuals, 
yielding nomothetic results (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). ESM is an ecologically 
valid method allowing for real-life contextual analysis of behavior with repeated-measure 
designs. ESM can extract information about subjects’ behavior, affect, and/or cognitions 
that can be compared to situational variables (Hormuth, 1986). Lastly, the questionnaires 
used in ESM procedures can vary to obtain as much information as desired about a 
subject’s internal and external experiences. 
ESM techniques also have limitations. For example, Larson and Csikszentmihalyi 
(1983) expressed concerns about sample biases. Potentially, subjects who are willing to 
participate in such studies like ESM studies that are time-consuming and require 
divulging of personal information may differ in important ways from subjects who refuse 
to participate. Furthermore, because of lengthy nature of ESM, many subjects may 
prematurely drop-out of the study. ESM questionnaires incorporate several questionnaires 
that intend to be thorough but it is impossible to create an exhaustive list of questions that 
address all possible events experienced by a subject. In addition, it is possible that 
subjects may misunderstand or misread questions and the procedure does not provide 
subjects an opportunity to explain their answers or provide additional information. Lastly, 
due to the personal nature of some ESM questionnaires, subjects may tend to under-
report parts of their experiences and over-report other aspects. 
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Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) 
 The Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) is a modification of the 
Experience Sampling Method (ESM). As in ESM, EMA subjects are given a device (e.g. 
a beeper, wrist watch, etc), that randomly emits a signal, at which time subjects are 
instructed to complete an experience questionnaire or record physiological states, such as 
heart rate (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). Subjects are usually signaled several times a day 
over a few weeks. EMA differs from ESM in that it provides investigators with increased 
flexibility in choosing to signal subjects in three different types of schedules: time 
contingent (e.g. every few hours), event contingent (e.g. after a target event, such as 
every meal), and signal contingent (e.g. at the prescribed signal; Wheeler & Reis, 1991). 
Investigators have the ability to choose the EMA sampling schedule that is most 
advantageous to their purpose. Questionnaires implemented in EMA studies also are 
slightly different from ESM questionnaires in that they elicit momentary reflection (e.g. 
at the moment of the signal) or recollections of events (e.g.; in the past 30-minutes; 
Smyth & Stone, 2003) 
EMA has been used frequently in the field of behavioral medicine to evaluate 
subjects’ behavioral, psychological, and physiological states in their natural environments 
(Stone & Shiffman, 1994). EMA has yielded data in several behavioral medicine and 
psychological fields such as stress and coping (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), behavior of 
cigarette smoking (Shiffman, 2005), cardiovascular disease (Kamarck, Schwartz, Janicki, 
Shiffman, & Raynor, 2003), asthma symptoms (Smyth, Stone, Hurewitz, & Kaell, 1999), 
and the possible uses of EMA in the field of psychiatry (Moskowitz & Young, 2006). 
Recently, EMA procedures have been used in the field of clinical psychology as Norton 
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and colleagues (2003) paired cognitive behavioral treatment and EMA in treating 
individuals with bulimia nervosa. Although significant differences were not found, results 
demonstrated slightly more favorable outcomes when EMA was included in the 
treatment, suggesting further research in this area may be worthwhile.  
EMA has also been used to study patterns of experience among couples or 
families. For example, Janicki and colleagues (2006) compared spousal interactions of 
married adults with their health. This study assessed subjects’ experiences and 
cardiovascular health for three years. They found men with better marital adjustment and 
frequent spousal interaction had decreased intima medial thickness (IMT), or thickness to 
artery walls, whereas women with better martial adjustment and more frequent spousal 
interaction were associated with increased IMT (Janicki, Kamarck, Shiffman, & 
Gwaltney, 2006). Moreover, marital adjustment was associated with frequent agreeable 
spousal interactions but not associated with the frequency of conflicted spousal 
interactions (Janicki et al., 2006).  
EMA is advantageous in providing researchers with flexibility, allowing for a 
variety of avenues to study both psychological and physical states over long periods of 
time (Stone, Turkkan, Bachrach, Jobe, Kurtzman, & Cain, 1999). Similar to ESM, EMA 
does not ask subject’s to speculate retrospectively about their experiences. Furthermore, 
EMA is ecologically valid in that it provides investigators with a glimpse into subjects’ 
experiences in their natural environments. 
 EMA is limited by its lengthy nature, requiring an extended time commitment 
from subjects in having them report physical and psychological data several times a day 
for several weeks. Lengthy techniques like EMA can potentially result in selection biases 
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and attrition difficulties. Moreover, occupational demands may hinder an individual’s 
opportunity to participate in EMA studies, leading to possible sample biases. For 
example, individuals in strenuous work environments (e.g., a construction worker, bus 
driver, fireman, etc.) which are loud or demanding may not have a chance to record 
thoughts or cognitions at a signal (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008). EMA is also at-
risk of causing changes in the behaviors it seeks to observe. EMA instructs subjects to 
observe and record their behaviors repeatedly, several times a day over several weeks. 
This type of attention to behavior can affect the rate at which these behaviors are 
preformed (Hufford, Shields, Shiffman, Paty, & Balabanis, 2002). Korotitsch and 
Nelson-Gray (1999) suggest that behaviors that the client wants to see change are most 
susceptible to changes as a result of self-monitoring.  
Think-Aloud (TA) Methods 
 Another technique used to explore the characteristics of inner experiences is 
Think-Aloud (TA). TA is used to primarily assess cognitions, what and how a person 
thinks, as he/she completes a prescribed task. Although TA mostly assesses cognitions, it 
was originally developed to better understand the relationship between cognition, affect, 
and behavior (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997; Ericsson & Simon, 1984). TA 
techniques have been used as early as the 1950s to study college students’ problem-
solving skills (Bloom & Broder, 1950) and to study the thought processes of average and 
superior chess players (de Groot, 1965).  
 TA studies typically explain to subjects that most people have some sort of 
“internal monologue,” like an ongoing stream of thoughts that occur as they go about 
their daily activities. Subjects are asked, as they complete an assigned task such as a math 
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problem or a game of chess, to tune into their mental thoughts and verbally repeat them 
out loud, or “think-aloud.” Subjects’ thoughts are recorded and later transcribed and 
interpreted (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). 
 TA techniques have been used in a variety of branches of psychology from 
consumer psychology studying the thought processes of African-American women as 
they purchase fruits and vegetables (Reicks, Smith, Henry, Reimer, Atwell, & Thomas, 
2003) to social psychology studying the thoughts of individuals as they recall and report 
at-risk sexual behaviors (Bogart, Walt, Pavlociv, Ober, Brown, & Kalichman, 2007).  
Recently, TA has been used to assess the effectiveness of educational tools. Cotton and 
Gresty (2006) completed a pilot study evaluating the effectiveness of TA at studying 
students’ ease with e-learning tools, or internet based learning tools. Subjects were asked 
to navigate through an e-learning site and verbalize their thoughts as they occurred. 
Although this study found potential uses of TA with the assessment of e-learning tools, 
they cited some specific methodological complications which need to be addressed prior 
to applying TA in this specific setting, such as monitoring guidance given to subjects and 
the effects of having subjects perform a task, subjects’ ability to pay attention to their 
ongoing internal monologue, and subjects’ ability to verbalize their thoughts out-loud as 
they occur internally.  
An advantage of TA is that it minimizes retrospective errors as subjects are asked 
to report their ongoing thought processes as they occur or immediately thereafter 
(Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). Also, TA is relatively unstructured, allowing 
subjects to report all cognitions in an open-ended manner rather than being limited to 
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prescribed questions chosen by an investigator. Lastly, TA methods are easily used in 
laboratory settings providing for a plethora of research opportunities. 
Despite its many advantages, TA also has some disadvantages. TA methods are 
not ecologically valid; thus they present a picture of laboratory-induced mental processes 
that may or may not parallel mental process outside of the laboratories. Some 
investigators have presented caution about reactive interference between verbalizing 
thoughts and the actual thinking process. During a TA task, subjects are asked to 
verbalize their ongoing cognitions while completing a task. Some critics of TA question 
subjects’ ability to complete the dual demands of paying attention to cognitions and 
simultaneously verbalizing them while not losing any important parts of the experience 
(Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). Also, Klinger (1975) suggested that subjects, while 
completing the Think-Aloud task, can only express a small portion of their cognitions 
since subjects’ verbalization will interfere with the natural flow of experience. It is also 
possible that cognitions that seem of relatively low frequency or low importance may not 
be reported at all or as often as those that seem to be of high relevance (Davison, 
Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). For example, if a subject is asked to report his experience 
while taking a math test, the subject may begin to think about what he is going to have 
for lunch but because this thought seems not related to the task at hand, the subject may 
be reluctant to verbalize it. 
Fundamentally, TA assumes a person’s stream of consciousness consists only of 
words and is presented in a constant stream of ongoing thoughts. However, some 
introspective research does not support this language-dominant internal world but rather 
an internal world populated by mental images, unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, 
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inner hearing, sensory experiences, and much more (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Asking 
subjects to report thoughts as they occur could result in subjects converting these other 
rich experiences into verbal terms that may not provide a precise portrait of the nature or 
richness of inner experience as it occurs. 
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) 
 The Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) paradigm was created 
as an alternative to the Think-Aloud (TA) method (Davison, Robins & Johnson, 1983). 
Like TA, ATSS assumes people have an ongoing “internal dialogue” that can be naturally 
and easily attended to (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). Similarly, ATSS assesses 
subjects’ inner thoughts as they verbalize their cognitions at the moment they occur. 
ATSS is a laboratory procedure in which subjects listen to a hypothetical scenario via a 
video or audio tape player and are asked to imagine themselves in that situation. Once the 
scenario has been played, subjects are asked to articulate their ongoing thoughts as they 
occur (Eckhardt, Barbour, & Davison, 1998). Following the simulated situation, subjects’ 
responses are coded for content and structure and further analyzed.  
 ATSS is advantageous in studying emotional experience because the selected 
scenarios can elicit a target emotion. Surveying subjects with similar or different 
scenarios and comparing the changes in think-aloud reports extracts qualitative data in 
terms of how cognitions change as a result of external influences. ATSS has been used to 
investigate the thought patterns of subjects with psychopathology. For example, ATSS 
has been used to compare the thoughts of subjects with and without depression (White, 
Davidson, Haaga, & White, 1992) and subjects with and without anxiety (Davidson, 
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Feldman, & Osborn, 1984). The latter study found an increase in intrusive thoughts 
concerning trauma for subjects with anxiety.  
ATSS has also contributed to the study of personality. For example, Rayburn and 
Davison (2002) evaluated subjects’ thoughts and empathy toward anti-gay hate crimes. 
They found that subjects expressed more aggressive intentions towards the perpetrator in 
hate crime scenarios as compared with non-hate crimes. Furthermore, subjects indicated 
more willingness to intervene and help the hate crime victim as compared to the non-hate 
crime victim. Rayburn and Davison (2002) also compared subjects’ attitudes towards 
homosexuals with ATSS. They found antigay attitudes predicted anger against the hate 
crime victim, disapproval of the hate crime victim, and support of the hate crime 
perpetrator.  
ATSS has also been used to study behavioral characteristics and their relations to 
thoughts. For example, Eckhardt, Barbour, and Stuart (1997) compared thoughts, 
cognitive distortions, and cognitive deficiencies of married men who were or were not 
violent with their wives. Their results indicated that violent men produced increased 
irrational beliefs and hostile attributional biases as compared with non-violent men. In 
addition, non-violent men reported less negative affect during anger provoking scenarios 
compared with violent men.  
ATSS provides investigators with the ability to explore thoughts as they occur 
free from retrospective errors. ATSS provides investigators with laboratory flexibility in 
that investigators can alter emotion or thought provoking scenarios to explore, describe, 
and compare thoughts from a variety of subjects in an assortment of scenarios (Davison, 
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Vogel, & Coffman, 1997). ATSS is primarily open-ended and allows for variability in the 
content and form of the cognitions reported.  
In terms of disadvantages, ATSS lacks ecological validity. Also, laboratory-
induced cognitions may not parallel real-life cognitions. ATSS techniques are also 
confounded by the dual demands of externally verbalizing thoughts. Particular thoughts 
that a subject may believe to be unimportant or off-task by could be left out due to the on-
the-spot, demanding task of ATSS. Lastly, ATSS provides information about how a 
subject thinks in specific situations; however, ATSS does not provide data with regard to 
how a person regularly thinks within his/her natural environment. It may be important to 
characterize the common thinking experience in order to better identify irregular thought 
patterns.  
Diary Methods 
 
Diary methods have also been used to investigate subject’s inner experiences. 
Diary methods refer to self-report instruments that are used repeatedly to examine 
experiences; for example, subjects may be asked to maintain a diary of their experiences 
over hours, days, weeks, and sometimes months (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). Diary 
methods usually have two goals: to explore phenomena as it unfolds over time and to 
investigate particular phenomena (Bolger et al., 2003). Diary strategies differ from 
personal diaries in that subjects are instructed to record thoughts, emotions, or behaviors 
about a specific topic as it occurs within a time-frame rather than writing freely about 
anything. Subjects are made aware of the research target such that they record 
accordingly. 
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 There are three types of diary demands: interval-contingent, signal-contingent, 
and event-contingent (Bolger et al., 2003). Interval-contingent methods require subjects 
to report their experiences at predetermined intervals (e.g., every 5 hours, every day, etc). 
Signal contingent relies upon signal devices to alert subjects to record diary entries at 
fixed, random, or a combination of fixed and random intervals. Event-contingent diary 
methods require subjects to record their experience each time an event occurs (e.g., every 
time they eat, each time they speak to their spouse, etc.).   
 Similar to ESM techniques, some diary studies use electronic devices for data 
collection. Electronic devices used with diary methods include palmtop computers or 
personal digital assistants (PDAs; Bolger et al., 2003). Despite the trend of using 
electronic devices, paper-and-pencil diaries are still the most often used. Paper-and-pencil 
diaries are equipped with some obvious limitations including subjects’ forgetfulness and 
compliance as well as subjects feeling hesitant to be completely open and honest in their 
entries with fear their diary can be viewed by others in their environment. Some studies 
have found electronic diaries increase compliance as compared to paper-and-pencil 
methods. Stone, Shiffman, Schwarz, Broderick, and Hufford (2002) demonstrated 
substantial differences in compliance between paper-and-pencil and computerized 
diaries. The study surveyed 80 subjects suffering from chronic pain. The study had 40 
subjects complete the procedures using the paper-and-pencil method and 40 subjects used 
the computerized method. The investigators unobtrusively placed photosensors that 
detected when diaries in the paper-pencil method were open and closed. The electronic 
devices were equipped with the ability to record automatically when diary entries were 
completed. Results found 90% of subjects reported compliance in the paper-and-pencil 
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method, whereas actual compliance was as low as 11%. Diary entries were submitted for 
scheduled times that did not line up with the photosensors registry of the diary being 
opened and closed suggesting many subjects made-up diary entries that were supposed to 
be completed at a specific time with regard to a specific event. The electronic diaries 
yielded substantially higher actual compliance at 94%.  
 On the other hand, Green, Rafaeli, Bolger, Shrout, and Reis (2006) found both the 
paper-and-pencil method and computerized method yielded a compliance rate of 
approximately 86 percent. Despite the comparable compliance rate, they found that 
subjects using the paper-and-pencil method were less likely than subjects using the 
computerized method to complete all of the daily entries. Green and colleagues (2006) 
also investigated compliance rates of the paper-and-pencil method combined with 
increasing subjects’ motivation and researcher-subject rapport. Results found only 9.9% 
of paper-and-pencil entries were made outside of a five to fifteen minute interval. 
 Diary methods are advantageous in that they reduce retrospective memory errors 
and allow for analysis of within-person differences as well as between-person differences 
(Bolger et al., 2003). For example, McAuliffe, DiFrancesico, and Reed (2007) requested 
subjects to maintain a daily diary of sexual behaviors for three months. At the end of the 
three months, subjects completed a retrospective survey estimating the frequency of 
sexual behaviors. Fifty-percent of subjects under-estimated their sexual practices and 
17% over-estimated their sexual practices on the retrospective questionnaire (McAuliffe, 
DiFranceisco, & Reed, 2007). Winkielman, Schwarz, and Belli (1998) suggest 
differences among retrospective questionnaires, sampling procedures, and diary reports 
are due to subjects’ interpretation of the questions. Concurrent reports, such as diary 
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methods and sampling procedures, provide a shorter reference period such as at the 
moment of a signal. How often a subject reports experiencing negative, self-degrading 
thoughts in the past week, month, or even year would most likely be less accurate than 
the same subject’s report of how often he/she experienced self-degrading thoughts within 
one day or one hour.  
Diary methods also have a number of disadvantages. For example, diary methods 
often require detailed training sessions to ensure subjects fully understand the diary 
protocols (Reis & Gabel, 2000). Little is known about whether dairying daily affects 
experiences that are reported (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). Some diary studies have 
documented negative mood elevation at the beginning of sampling, although the elevated 
mood is usually short-lived (Gleason, Bolger, & Shrout, 2001). Moreover, diary methods 
cover a broad range of experiences and may not be the best tool for focusing in on 
important details in order to explore the fundamental, precise characteristics of inner 
experience. 
Descriptive Experience Sampling  
 
 Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is an idiographic, exploratory method 
developed by Hurlburt (1990, 1993) to describe inner experience faithfully. DES begins 
by attempting to apprehend single, randomly chosen moments of inner experience and 
then uses these individual moments of experience to build an idiographic profile of an 
individual’s inner experience. DES aims to observe and describe pristine internal 
experience free of interference from the subject or the investigator (Hurlburt & Akhter, 
2006). Unlike ESM, DES rules out anything that is outside of the subject’s current 
awareness (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) and thus subject’s explanations, interpretations, 
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“unconscious” processes, and events occurring before or after the beep are withheld from 
the DES method.  
 DES subjects are given a device that randomly emits a beep through an earphone. 
Subjects are asked to choose a time during the day to turn on the beeper and carry it with 
them throughout their regular daily activities. Once turned on, the beeper randomly will 
emit six beeps. At the moment a beep sounds, subjects are asked to “freeze” and 
remember or take notice of their inner experience at the moment the beep sounded. Inner 
experience refers to anything within a subject’s awareness, including but not limited to 
thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, etc. Subjects are asked to jot down notes about 
their inner experience in a small notebook, reset the beeper, and continue on with their 
daily activities. This procedure is typically repeated until the subject has received six 
beeps, which usually takes about three hours. By nature, DES is an exploratory 
procedure; therefore, specific instructions as to what the subject will most likely 
experience are not given and it is entirely possible a subject will experience something no 
previous subject has experienced. A detailed description of the instructions given to 
subjects, including an annotated transcript of the instructions, can be found in Hurlburt 
and Heavey (2006). 
Within 24 hours of sampling, an interview takes place between the investigator 
and the subject in which they discuss each moment of sampled inner experience. The 
goal of this interview is to develop as clear and precise an understanding of each sampled 
moment of inner experience as possible. During the interview the investigator strives to 
remain non-leading in his/her questioning. In order to remain unbiased and non-leading, 
the subject and investigator must bracket their presuppositions with regard to the nature 
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of inner experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). In addition, the investigator must also 
carefully evaluate the subject’s use of “subjunctifiers,” or descriptions of inner 
experiences that are verbally asserted using subjunctive, non-declarative statements 
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  
DES is an iterative procedure (Hurlburt, 2009; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Most 
subjects are not skilled observers of their inner experiences. During the first day of 
sampling they usually are unprepared for the investigator’s direct and specific 
questioning about their moments of inner experiences. Thus, DES practitioners usually 
consider the first day of sampling a practice session and do not include the first day of 
sampled moments in data analyses (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Usually, subjects engage 
in three to eight days of sampling yielding between 18 and 48 beeps. 
DES studies vary greatly in the types of subjects sampled and subjects’ reported 
experiences. Some DES studies explore one subject’s inner experiences. In these studies, 
the DES method is used for idiographic purposes, aimed to describe the unique 
characteristics of a unique individual (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Other DES studies 
explore a collection of subjects who have a feature in common, such as a psychiatric 
diagnosis (e.g., schizophrenia, depression, Asperger’s syndrome, etc.) or an external 
characteristic (e.g., speed of talking). In such studies, the investigator first apprehends 
subjects’ experiences idiographically and then nomothetically examines if any salient 
characteristics emerge across the collection of subjects as a whole (Hurlburt & Akhter, 
2006). Such nomothetic analyses of inner experiences begin at the bottom – faithfully 
describing a single experience of a single subject. Idiographic DES studies have been 
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used to develop a codebook for frequently occurring characteristics of experience 
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). 
DES has been used to explore inner experiences of individuals with psychiatric 
diagnoses in common. For example, Hurlburt, Happe, and Frith (1994) explored the inner 
experience of three subjects diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome. They found the 
Aspergers subjects’ inner experiences were either nonexistent or exclusively 
characterized by images with rarely any other feature of inner experience. In addition, 
these subjects showed no interest or curiosity about the differences between their own 
experiences and experiences of other subjects, something that is uncommon with the DES 
subjects (Hurlburt, Happe, & Frith, 1994). DES has also been used to explore experiences 
of subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987; Hurlburt, 1990). 
Such studies have demonstrated that subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia tend to 
experience “goofed-up” images and hyper-clear emotional experiences. These studies 
have suggested perhaps individuals with schizophrenia experience distortions or 
hallucinations on a smaller scale everyday in their conscious experience (Hurlburt & 
Melancon, 1987a). Subjects’ with anxiety (Hebert & Hurlburt, 1993) and depression 
(Hurlburt, 1993) have also participated in DES studies. Results indicate subjects with 
increased anxiety often engage in self and other-directed criticism (Hebert & Hurlburt, 
1993). Subjects with depression tend to experience more unsymbolized thinking as 
compared to subjects without depression (Hurlburt, 1993).  
DES has also explored the relationship between inner experiences and external 
characteristics. Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002) evaluated the connection between 
inner experience and the rate of subjects’ speaking measured in words per minute. They 
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found the collection of subjects with high-speech-rates experienced three-times more 
multiple awarenesses (25.9% as compared with 7.1%) and experienced higher frequency 
of just engaging in an activity with no ongoing inner experience, a phenomenon called 
“just doing,” as compared to the comparison group.  
High inter-rater reliability has been demonstrated for the DES method such that 
DES investigators agree upon the categorization of experiences using a codebook 
developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Results yielded 
interobserver agreement of 98% for the 11 low frequency characteristics of inner 
experience and 91.3% for the five high frequency characteristics. The characteristic with 
the lowest reliability was sensory awareness. 
DES is well suited to exploring inner experience in that it captures pristine inner 
experiences; it is exploratory and idiographic in nature; and it does not make assumptions 
about the characteristics of inner experience such as assuming inner experience is always 
present or consists of one pattern for all subjects. DES reduces reliance on subjects’ 
memory by having the subject take notes about the experience immediately after it occurs 
and by scheduling the follow-up expositional interview within 24-hours of the collection 
of beeps. DES is ecologically valid, allowing for a depiction of inner experience in 
subjects’ natural environments.  
Like most qualitative methods, data collection in the DES method is time-
consuming requiring a substantial commitment of the investigator’s and subject’s time. 
For example, subjects are asked to come in for an initial meeting with the researchers 
during which they are given a brief description of the DES procedure as well as 
instructions regarding using the beeper and collecting sampled moments of experience. 
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This first meeting generally lasts between a half hour and an hour. Subjects are then 
asked to collect six moments of experience during a time of their choosing. This takes 
approximately another three hours. After the collection of the beeps, subjects return for 
an hour long expositional interview about their experiences at each moment of the beep. 
After the completion of this process, the researchers write a brief description of each 
moment of experience. This process is repeated usually four to six times. The time 
consuming nature of DES limits the number of subjects that can be used for each study. 
For example, sampling with 30 subjects may take an entire academic year to collect. 
Another potential limitation to DES research is the lack of situational control. 
Subjects are asked to collect sampled moments of their experience during any time of 
their choosing. Some subjects collect their moments of experience while in class while 
other subjects may collect their moments of experience while working and so forth. The 
situational variability may account for some of the differences in experience observed 
between groups.  Additional research is needed to further understand the effects of 
situational variability on inner experience. 
Another challenge faced by DES researchers is reducing the inner experience of 
subjects into valid idiographic summaries.  There is the potential for bias or error to occur 
during this process.  This process can be likened to trying to describe a unique landscape: 
What does one focus on?  What are the salient features of the landscape?  How do you 
describe them with fidelity?  Different investigators might focus on different aspects or 
features of the “landscape” even in equally faithful descriptions of it.   
Perhaps most importantly, DES is a method that appears to require high levels of 
skill to be performed with fidelity.  It is difficult to train these skills and challenging to 
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determine the level of skill of specific investigators.  Furthermore, neither the subject nor 
the investigator appear to be in a good position to independently assess their level of skill 
at performing DES.  This is a complex issue that deserves further attention.   
Present Study 
 
 This study employed Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to explore the inner 
experiences of a sample of college students. There were four aims of this study. The first 
was to describe the phenomena of inner experience, their relative frequency and the 
degree to which moments of experience could be coded reliably.  The second aim was to 
examine the degree to which there were individual differences in inner experience. Third, 
this study set out to identify other meaningful dimensions along which inner experience 
could be characterized.  Fourth, this study examined perceptions of the degree to which 
subjects could to capture, describe and understand inner experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Subjects 
 The sample comprised 21 undergraduate students (14 female and 7 male) taking 
introductory psychology courses at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). In 
return for their participation, subjects were provided credit for their course research 
requirement. The mean age of the students was 24.6 years (SD = 9.3 years). Fifty-two 
percent of the subjects self identified as Caucasian, 24% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 19% 
as Hispanic, and 5% as other. Freshman made up 33% of the sample, sophomores made 
up 19%, juniors made up 33%, and seniors made up 14%. Data was collected between 
September 2008 and May 2009. 
Materials 
The informed consent form provided subjects with a description of the study 
including expected risks and benefits of participation. It also included contact information 
for the present study’s investigators and the office for the protection of research subjects.  
The demographic questionnaire included questions concerning a subject’s name, 
address, phone number(s), email address, age, ethnicity, sex, marital status, education 
level, and employment.  
The Subject’s Sampling Feedback Questionnaire and Interviewer’s Sampling 
Feedback Questionnaire were self-report questionnaires created by the investigators of 
the present study. Both questionnaires included four questions pertaining to a subject’s or 
the interviewer’s perceptions about the DES process. The Subject’s Sampling Feedback 
Questionnaire included the following questions: To what degree could you adequately 
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capture your inner experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree could you fully 
describe your experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree did the interview(s) 
fully understand your inner experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree did 
the subject’s  understanding of your inner experience change as a result of the interview?  
Subjects were asked to rate the four questions on a seven-point scales ranging from 0 (not 
at all) to 6 (extremely). The Interviewer’s Sampling Feedback Questionnaire included the 
following questions: To what degree did the subject adequately capture his/her inner 
experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree did the subject fully describe 
his/her experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree did you fully understand 
the subject’s inner experience at the moment of the beep? To what degree did your 
understanding of his/her inner experience change as a result of the interview? The 
interviewer(s) rated the four questions on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) 
to 6 (extremely).  
A portable, pocket-sized beeper created by Hurlburt (2007) was used to randomly 
beep subjects and alert them to pay attention to their current inner experience. The beeper 
is a small rectangular box and is equipped with an on/off/volume control. When 
activated, the pocket-sized beeper randomly emits a 700-Hz tone through an ear-piece in 
intervals ranging from 0 to 60 minutes with a mean of 30 minutes. The volume is 
adjustable, thus allowing adjustment for personal preference and background noise levels. 
A pocket-sized, 3 X 5 inch notebook was given to subjects to record notes about their 
inner experience when the beep sounds. 
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Procedure 
 Subjects volunteered for the present study through Experimetrix, a web-based 
database of current psychology research projects seeking volunteers at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). Students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at 
UNLV have access to participation opportunities via Experimetrix. Interested subjects 
signed up for the study and scheduled an appointment for an initial meeting. All 
appointments took place in the Experience Sampling Lab at UNLV and were conducted 
individually.  
During the first appointment, the study was explained to subjects including the 
DES method and procedures (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). It was explained that 
audiotaped or videotaped interviews were required for participation in this study. Any 
questions were answered and then subjects were asked to provide informed consent. 
Consenting subjects were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire. 
After consenting to the research project and completing the demographic 
questionnaire, the subject was given a beeper and a 3 X 5 notebook. The investigator 
demonstrated how to work the beeper including how to turn it on and off, how to adjust 
the volume, how to plug in and wear the earphone, and how to reset it. The subject was 
instructed to turn on the beeper during a time of his/her choosing and to then continue on 
with his/her daily activities. The investigator told the subject that once the beeper is 
turned on, it would emit a beep sometime within the next hour. At the onset of the beep, 
the subject was asked to recall what was occurring in his/her inner experience. The 
subject was instructed to jot down notes about his/her ongoing inner experience in the 3 
X 5 notebook. It was explained that the purpose of these notes was to help him/her recall 
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the details of his/her experience during a later interview. The subject was asked to stop 
the beeper after each beep and reset the beeper and continue this process until a total of 
six beeps were emitted. In explaining the procedures, the investigator was careful not to 
give specific, detailed instructions about what to pay attention to at the moment of the 
beep other than whatever was ongoing in awareness; these details were left unclear 
because the investigator did not know what subjects would experience at the moment of 
the beep.  
The investigator also explained to the subject the nature of the co-investigator 
relationship of DES. The investigator explained to subjects that participation involved 
wearing the beeper a total of four days and returning to the lab after each day of sampling 
in order to participate in an expositional interview. The purpose of these expositional 
interviews was to faithfully apprehend and then describe the subject’s inner experience at 
each beep. During the expositional interview, the subject was asked to be open and 
honest about his/her inner experiences and was given the right, at any time, to refuse 
discussion of sensitive material that may have been captured by the moment of the beep. 
At any point in the study, subjects were allowed to terminate their participation in the 
study. One subject decided not to participate in the study after hearing the description 
from the investigators. Another subject only completed three days of sampling but was 
included in the final sample. 
Prior to the completion of this first appointment, a second appointment was 
scheduled for a one-hour long expositional interview. The second appointment was 
scheduled to take place within 24 hours of the collection of beeps.  
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During the second appointment, a team DES researchers including an experienced 
DES researcher (either Dr. Chris Heavey or Dr. Russell Hurlburt) and one or two 
graduate students training in the DES method interviewed the subject about his/her 
collected samples until both the interviewers and the subject believed they have clear 
apprehension of the subject’s inner experience at each beep. The interview was 
videotaped or audiotaped. After the interview, the subject was asked to complete a 
Subject’s Sampling Feedback Questionnaire. At the same time but independently, the 
interviewers(s) completed the Interviewer’s Sampling Feedback Questionnaire. Subjects 
were also provided with a brief written description of the moments of experience they 
had described in the previous interview session. Subjects were asked to read and rate the 
accuracy of the descriptions on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 representing not at all accurate 
and 10 representing completely accurate. Subjects were given these instructions verbally 
and they were told to record their ratings next to each beep descriptions. Subjects were 
also given permission to change anything in the written description that did not 
accurately represent their experience. Subjects rated the accuracy of beep descriptions 
discussed in the first three interviews. The collection of sampled beeps followed by an 
expositional interview was repeated four times yielding a possible combined 24 samples 
per subject. 
After each day of sampling, the interviewers(s) prepared a written summary of 
each sampled moments of the subject’s experiences. Generally, one of the graduate 
students present during the interview composed a draft of the beep summaries which was 
then reviewed and edited by the other researchers present during the interview. The final 
agreed upon description of each experience was used for analysis within this study.  
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After completing this iterative process of sampling, interviewing, and writing up 
the sampled moments of experience, the primary investigators had the beep descriptions 
coded by three DES researchers using the codebook of experience developed by Hurlburt 
and Heavey (1999) for the presence of seven previously identified phenomena of 
experience including sensory awareness, inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, inner 
seeing, feeling, inner hearing, and just doing. The researchers were asked to indicate 
either “yes” if the phenomena was present in a particular beep description or “no” it was 
not.  
Sensory awareness refers to an experience in which one pays attention to a 
specific sensory aspect of something within one’s environment (Hurlburt, Heavey, & 
Bensaheb, 2009). For example, if a person had just bitten into a juicy apple and was 
paying particular attention to the sweet taste of the juice in his mouth, he would be 
experiencing a sensory awareness. In this example, the sensory aspect (e.g., sweet taste of 
juice in his mouth) is the primary focus of experience.  
Inner speech refers to the experience of speaking words in one’s own voice (e.g., 
same vocal characteristics) without the presence of external sound (Heavey & Hurlburt, 
2008). A person would be experiencing inner speech if while eating an apple he innerly 
(with no external sound) says to himself, “this is a good apple.”  
Unsymbolized thinking refers to the experience of thinking without the content of 
the thinking being represented in words, images, or other symbols (Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2002; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2008). An example of unsymbolized 
thinking could be a person eating an apple and wondering what type of apple he is eating. 
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To be unsymbolized thinking, the wondering would occur without being represented in 
words, images, or other symbols.  
Feeling refers to an emotional experience (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). A feeling 
can include any affective experience including happiness, sadness, anger, nervousness 
and so forth. An example of a feeling could include a person feeling nervous which was 
accompanied by an uneasy, butterfly feeling in his stomach.  For this to be coded as a 
feeling, the affective experience must be directly present in experience rather than 
inferred from actions or other signs of emotional processes.   
Inner seeing is the experience of seeing something that is not physically present 
(Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). An example of inner seeing could be a person thinking about 
the lunch he is about to eat  
Inner hearing refers to the experience of hearing something that is not physically 
present(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). An example of inner hearing is a person innerly 
hearing with no real external sound a song playing in which they do not experience 
producing the sound (as with inner speech) but rather experience hearing it.  Another 
example of this phenomenon is recording ones voice in a tape player and hearing it back. 
Inner hearing resembles the experience of hearing one’s voice without producing it. Inner 
hearing can also involve hearing one’s own voice mentally without the experience of 
innerly speaking.   
Lastly, just doing is where a person is engaged in doing something without any 
mental experience beyond the engagement in the activity (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). For 
example, someone would be just doing if at the moment of the beep they were watching 
television and were engaged in what they were watching.  In these instances the 
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individual is experientially engaged in the activity without anything else being present in 
experience.   
The three DES researchers who coded the beep descriptions for the presence of 
the aforementioned phenomena of experience were graduate students training in the DES 
method. At the time at which they coded the beep descriptions for the present study they 
each had a minimum of one year of experience with the DES method. At the same time 
as they were asked to code the seven previously identified phenomena of inner 
experience they were also asked to rate the beep descriptions on three new dimensions of 
experience. They were asked to Rate the degree of richness and detail in the inner 
experience on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 6 (Extremely). They were also asked to 
indicate How many experiences (e.g., thoughts, emotions, sensory awarenesses) are 
present at the moment of the beep with 0 – No Experience Present, 1 – One Experience 
Present (e.g., one thought), 2 – Two Experiences Present (e.g., a thought and an 
emotion), 3 – Three Experiences Present, 4 – Four or more Experiences Present. Raters 
were also asked to Rate the overall positivity or negativity of the experience using a 
Likert scale ranging from -3 (Negative) to 3 (Positive).All of the beeps collected were 
coded for the presence of these phenomena and rated for the new dimensions of 
experience with the exception of beeps collected on the first day of sampling, beeps that 
occurred while the subject was writing or discussing a previous beep, and beeps that 
occurred while the subject was asleep or away from the beeper. Following the first day of 
sampling, subjects were asked to collect 6 moments of beeps 3 additional times yielding 
18 beeps per subject. After the beeps were eliminated for the aforementioned reasons, we 
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were left with 327 beep descriptions that the researchers coded. The researchers were not 
given any practice trials to code the beep descriptions or any additional training 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The Phenomena of Inner Experience  
 The first aim of this study was to carefully observe and describe the phenomena 
of inner experience present in this sample.  The researchers conducting each expositional 
interview sought to apprehend each moment of experience and then produce a written 
description of each moment.  As this process unfolded, researchers tried to remain open 
to the possibility that previously undiscovered or unrecognized phenomena would 
emerge.  No new phenomena were recognized.   
 The beep descriptions were coded by three DES researchers using the codebook 
of experience developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999) for the presence of seven 
previously identified phenomena of experience including sensory awareness, inner 
speech, unsymbolized thinking, inner seeing, feeling, inner hearing, and just doing.  
 The three independent raters demonstrated significant inter-rater agreement for 
each phenomenon of experience. The percentage of agreement was determined by 
dividing the frequency with which all three raters agreed on the presence of a given 
phenomena for a particular moment with the total number of coded samples.  As shown 
in Table 1, the raters were in agreement more than 70% of the time for each dimension of 
inner experience with the exception of just doing, for which the percentage of agreement 
was 67%. The highest percentage of agreement was for inner seeing followed by inner 
hearing (93% and 91% respectively).  
 Table 1 also summarizes the frequency with which these phenomena were present 
in sampled moments. A phenomenon was determined to be present when it was identified 
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by at least two of the three coders. The most frequently occurring phenomenon was 
sensory awareness, which was present in approximately 33% of sampled moments. 
Feeling and unsymbolized thinking were also present in more than one-quarter of the 
sampled moments of experience (30.4% and 26.4% respectively). The least frequently 
occurring form of coded experience was inner hearing which was present only 6.3% of 
the time. Several phenomena can occur simultaneously (e.g., a person can experience 
sensory awareness and inner speech at the time same); therefore, the sum of the 
frequencies of phenomena exceeds 100%.  
 
Table 1 
Frequency of Phenomena Experienced and Percentage of Agreement 
Characteristic Frequency Percentage of Agreement 
1. Sensory Awareness 33.3% 72% 
2. Feeling 30.4% 83% 
3. Unsymbolized Thinking 26.4% 82% 
4. Inner Seeing 24.2% 93% 
5. Inner Speech 18.5% 89% 
6. Just Doing 10.5% 67% 
7. Inner Hearing 6.3% 91% 
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Individual Differences in Inner Experience 
To determine the extent to which there were individual differences in the relative 
frequency of phenomena of inner experience, we used the beep codings described above 
for the seven previously identified phenomena of experience and looked at the frequency 
with which each phenomena was experienced by each subject. Table 2 demonstrates that 
there were large individual differences in the frequency of phenomena experienced 
within this sample. The column Within Subject Lowest Frequency gives the lowest 
percentage for which that phenomenon was experienced by a single subject as well as the 
number of subjects who had the same degree of (in)frequency. For example, inner 
hearing was the least common of the coded phenomenon, being entirely absent (0% 
frequency) for 12 subjects. In contrast, every subject experienced some sensory 
awareness in their sampled moments with the lowest frequency for sensory awareness 
being 6%.  The column Within Subject Highest Frequency gives the highest percentage 
for which that phenomenon was experienced by a subject as well as the number of 
subjects that experienced that phenomenon within 10% of the highest value. For example, 
the highest frequency for feeling was 62% and five subjects experienced feeling within 
10% of that frequency. The highest percentage was for inner speech as one subject 
experienced inner speech 94% of the time. In contrast, the highest percentage of just 
doing experienced by one subject was 31%. 
The column Dominant Experience in Table 2 represents the number of subjects 
who experienced that phenomenon 50% or more of the time. The most common 
dominant form of experience was feeling (dominant for seven subjects) followed by 
sensory awareness (dominant for five subjects). No subjects experienced just doing or 
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inner hearing more than 50% of the time. Some subjects appeared to have their inner 
experience dominated by a single form of inner experience. In contrast, other subjects did 
not seem to have a dominant form of inner experienced but rather had several forms of 
inner experience approximately equally. Some subjects did not have some forms of inner 
experience in any of their sampled moments. 
 
Table 2 
Frequency of Common Phenomena of Inner Experience 
Characteristic 
Within Subject 
Lowest 
Frequency 
Within 
Participant 
Median (%) 
Within Subject 
Highest 
Frequency** 
Dominant  
Experience 
(number of 
subjects)* 
Sensory Awareness 6% (1) 31 79% (1) 5 
Feeling 0% (3) 25 62% (5) 7 
Unsymbolized  Thinking 0% (2) 17 65% (3) 4 
Inner Seeing 0% (4) 16 80% (1) 4 
Inner Speech 0% (6) 11 94% (1) 2 
Just Doing 0% (5) 7 31% (1) 0 
Inner Hearing 0% (12) 0 33% (1) 0 
Note. *An experience was considered “dominant” when it was present in greater than 
50% of the sampled moments. **The number in parantheses represents the number of 
individuals who experienced that phenomenon within 10% of the highest frequency. 
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Other Characteristics of Inner Experience 
 The third aim of the study was to examine the moments of experience and look 
for other meaningful dimensions by which inner experience could be characterized. To 
explore new possible dimensions of experience, the primary investigators (Janell Mihelic 
and Christopher Heavey) independently reviewed the same 327 beep descriptions that 
were coded previously to brainstorm potential characterizations of inner experience. 
After independently reviewing the beep descriptions, the primary investigators came 
together to review the possible characterizations. Six new dimensions, described below, 
were identified as possible new dimensions. 
 To determine the extent to which these new potential characterizations could be 
used to characterize moments of experience, 20 beep descriptions were selected randomly 
and the primary investigators independently tried to apply the new dimensions to the 
beep descriptions. If both investigators agreed that a dimensions could be reliably applied 
to our sampled moments, we then had the same three independent raters describes above 
rate 327 beep descriptions using the new dimension. Only three dimensions were found 
to be well suited for the sampled moments. 
 One type of characterization of inner experience considered was evaluating 
whether the focus of the experience was on future, past, or presently occurring events. At 
times, subjects had moments of inner experience in which they were engaged in recalling 
a past event or emotional experience. Future focused experiences referred to sampled 
moments in which the focus was on an event that had not yet occurred (e.g., worrying 
about an upcoming exam). Presently occurring events referred to paying attention to 
something occurring in present time. The primary investigators tried to characterize 
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moments of experience using these dimensions but found it difficult to differentiate 
between future occurring events (e.g., would they really occur in the future) and past 
events (e.g., did they really exist or are they fantasy). In addition, some may argue that 
what a person experiences in the present moment regardless of what it pertains to would 
be a presently occurring event. After discussion we agreed that the moments of 
experience could not be reliably characterized along this dimension.   
 Another characterization that was considered was differentiating between 
experiences in which the focus was on internal phenomenon (e.g., thought, emotion, etc.) 
or on external phenomenon (e.g., doing something, looking at something in one’s 
environment). The primary investigators tried to characterize moments of experience in 
this way but found it difficult as some sampled moments consisted of both internally 
focused and externally focused experiences (e.g., the subject was doing both at the 
moment of the beep). Similarly, at times it was difficult to determine if something was an 
internal or external phenomenon. For example, a subject may have been typing the letter 
“A” on a keyboard and was innerly saying “A.” This experience could be considered both 
an internal phenomenon as well as an external phenomenon. After discussion we agreed 
that the moments of experience could not be reliably characterized along this dimension.   
 The primary investigators also considered whether subjects’ inner experiences 
were related to what they were doing at the moment of the beep. For example, a subject 
may have been typing on the computer but having a thought about what they were going 
to have for dinner. In this example, the inner experience was not related to what the 
subject was physically doing at the moment of the beep. In contrast, a subject may have 
been physically typing on the computer and having a thought about what he/she was 
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typing about, an example in which inner experience is related to the physical behavior. 
The investigators found this characterization of inner experience complicated as it was 
often difficult to specify what a subject was actually doing at the moment of the beep. For 
example, a person could be sitting in front of a television that is turned on (behavior) but 
actually looking at the clock and having a thought about what they were going to do in 30 
minutes. In that example, the external behavior could be either watching television, in 
which case the inner experience was not related to what the subject was doing at the 
moment of the beep, or the external behavior could be looking at the clock which could 
be related to the subject’s inner experience at that moment. In addition, it is not standard 
protocol in DES to ask detailed questions regarding what the subject was doing at the 
moment of the beep. After discussion we agreed that the moments of experience could 
not be reliably characterized along this dimension.   
 Three other characterizations of inner experience were evaluated and determined 
to be potentially viable. First, we tried to characterize moments of experience based upon 
the degree of richness and detail in the experience. For example, some subjects had 
simple experiences in which one may have been innerly saying to himself, “I need to go 
to the store.”  In contrast, some subjects had richer or detailed experiences. For example, 
one subject may have been feeling anxious about an upcoming test which was associated 
with experiencing a large knot the size of a softball lodged in their throat. After 
discussion we agreed that the moments of experience potentially could be reliably 
characterized along this dimension.   
 Another characterization of inner experience that we examined was the number of 
experience (e.g., thoughts, emotions, sensory awareness … etc) present at a particular 
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moment. Some subjects only had one phenomenon of experience present at a particular 
moment (e.g., only inner speech). On the other hand, other subjects regularly experienced 
more than one phenomenon of experience at a particular moment. For example, one 
could simultaneously be feeling sad (feeling), innerly speaking to oneself (inner speech), 
and imaginally seeing something (inner seeing). After discussion we agreed that the 
moments of experience potentially could be reliably characterized along this dimension.   
 The last characterization that we examined was the overall valence (e.g., 
positivity or negativity) of a particular experience. Some subjects’ experiences appeared 
to be primarily negative. For example, one may have felt sad at the moment of the beep 
thinking about a deceased loved one. In contrast, other experiences appear to be relatively 
positive. For instance, a person could have been feeling happy at the moment of the beep 
thinking of an upcoming date. After discussion we agreed that the moments of experience 
potentially could be reliably characterized along this dimension.    
To examine the inter-rater reliability for the new characterizations of inner 
experience, we calculated intraclass correlations for each beep across the three raters 
within each subject. We then took the mean of those intraclass correlations for each of the 
dimensions. We found a mean intraclass correlation greater than .80 for all three 
dimensions (see Table 3).  Table 3 also presents the mean ratings for each of these three 
dimensions of inner experience and the respective standard deviations.   
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Table 3 
Inter-Rater Agreement 
Characterization Mean ICC Rater 
Agreement 
SD Mean 
Rating 
SD 
Richness 
 
.83 .09 2.70 .78 
Number of experiences 
present 
 
.68 .09 1.53 .37 
Valence .87 .06 -.04 .23 
  
 
 Table 4 summarizes the correlations between the new characterizations.  These 
correlations are based on the average rating for all three raters averaged across all beeps 
for each subject (i.e., one average characterization value per subject).  Valence was not 
significantly correlated with either richness or number of experience. In contrast, richness 
and number of experience were significantly correlated. 
 
Table 4 
Correlation between Ratings 
 Richness  Number of Experiences Valence 
Richness  1   
Number of Experience .67* 1  
Valence .00 -.13 1 
* p<.01, n = 21 
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 Table 5 provides the correlations between the newly identified characterizations 
of experience (richness, number of experience, and valence) and the seven previously 
identified phenomena of experience. To calculate this, we again used the average ratings 
of the three raters for each subject averaged across all of the subject’s beeps. Both 
richness and number of experiences were significantly positively correlated with sensory 
awareness and feeling. Both were negatively correlated with just doing. The valence of 
an experience was not significantly correlated with the frequency of any of the 
phenomena of experience. 
 
Table 5 
Correlation between New Dimensions and Previously Identified Dimensions 
 Sensory 
Awareness 
Inner 
Speech 
Inner 
Hearing 
Unsymb. 
Thinking 
Inner 
Seeing 
Just 
Doing 
Feeling 
Richness .43* -.34 -.08 -.01 .46* -.64** .47* 
Number .53* .12 -.10 .08 .37 -.50* .64** 
Valence -.24 .07 .04 .16 -.26 -.04 .11 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, n = 21 
 
 We also examined the relationship between the ratings for the newly identified 
characterizations of experience (richness, number of experience, and valence) with the 
presence or absence of the seven previously identified phenomena of experience for each 
beep. Table 6 demonstrates the correlations. 
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Table 6 
Correlation between New Dimensions and Previously Identified Phenomena for Each 
Beep 
 Sensory 
Awareness 
Inner 
Speech 
Inner 
Hearing 
Unsymb. 
Thinking 
Inner 
Seeing 
Just 
Doing 
Feeling 
Richness .27** .03 -.09 -.01 .44** -.36** .31** 
Number .42** .12* -.09 -.11 .21** -.28* .39** 
Valence -.14 .05 .12* .09 -.01 .00 -.014 
* p<.05, ** p<.01. 
 
Subject and Interviewer Feedback Forms 
To examine subjects’ and interviewers’ perceptions of subjects’ ability to capture 
and describe inner experience and interviewers’ understanding of subjects’ inner 
experiences, subjects and interviewers were asked to independently complete the 
Feedback Questionnaire after each expositional interview. For most interviews, three 
DES researchers were present. First, we examined the degree to which the interviewers 
agreed with one another on their ratings. Table 7 demonstrates the agreement between the 
three interviewers’ ratings. For all three dimensions, the interviewers demonstrated 
substantial agreement yielding interclass correlations greater than .65. 
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Table 7 
Intraclass Correlations between Interviewers 
 Intraclass Correlations 
Subjects’ Ability to Capture Experience .79 
Subjects’ Ability to Describe Experience .71 
Interviewers’ Ability to Understand Experience .68 
 
 The three interviewers’ ratings were averaged together to produce a mean for each 
rating for each interview day. Table 8 contains the means of the interviewers’ ratings for 
all four days of sampling. The interviewers reported perceiving an increase in subjects’ 
ability to capture and describe their experience from Day 1 to Day 4. Interviewers also 
reported an increase in interviewers’ ability to understand subjects’ inner experiences 
between Day 1 and Day 4.  
Table 8 also summarizes the mean of subjects’ ratings of their ability to capture 
and describe their inner experience by sampling day as reported on the Subject and 
Interviewer Feedback forms. Subjects were also asked to rate the degree to which they 
believed the interviewers’ understood their inner experiences. Overall, subjects reported 
that they improved in their ability to capture and describe their inner experiences between 
Day 1 and Day 4. In contrast, there was a slight decrease in reported ability to describe 
inner experience between Day 3 and Day 4.  
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Table 8 
Subjects’ and Interviewers’ Mean Responses on the Feedback Questionnaire 
Question on Feedback Questionnaire Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 
Subject’s Ratings: Subjects’ Ability to Capture 
Experience 
3.10 4.33 4.67 4.95 
Interviewers’ Ratings: Subjects’ Ability to 
Capture Experience 
2.97 4.04 5.02 5.10 
Subject’s Ratings: Subjects’ Ability to Describe 
Experience 
3.55 4.29 4.76 4.60 
Interviewers’ Ratings: Subjects’ Ability to 
Describe Experience 
3.11 4.15 4.77 4.87 
Subjects’ Ratings: Interviewers’ Ability to 
Understand Experience 
3.95 4.57 4.81 5.10 
Interviewers’ Ratings: Interviewers’ Ability to 
Understand Experience 
3.27 3.99 4.60 4.71 
  
 
The improvements in ratings from Day 1 to Day 4 were evaluated for significance 
using repeated measures ANOVA. Results demonstrated significant improvement in 
subjects’ ratings of their ability to capture their inner experience across the four days of 
sampling, F (3, 16) = 20.17, p = .001 as well as interviewers ratings of subjects’ ability to 
capture their inner experience, F (3, 16) = 17.56, p = .001. Results also demonstrated 
significant improvement in subjects’ and interviewers’ ratings of subjects' ability to 
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describe their inner experience, F (3, 16), = 5.97, p = .01 and F (3, 16) = 17.35, p = .001 
respectively. Lastly, significant improvement in subjects’ and interviewers’ ratings of 
interviewers’ ability to understand their inner experience across the four days of sampling 
were also observed, F (3, 16) = 7.24, p = .001 and F (3, 16) = 10.48, p = .001 
respectively. Overall, the feedback questionnaires provide limited information 
regarding the quality of subjects’ ability to capture and describe their inner experience 
and interviewers’ understanding of subjects’ inner experience and it was determine 
conceptually that these instruments cannot be relied upon as an indication of the quality 
of the DES process because neither subject nor investigators have a clear basis from 
which to judge their ability and/or effectiveness. Thus although it is likely that the 
perceived growth indicated by the increasing means on the respective feedback 
questionnaires does represent relative improvement in the process over time, it is 
impossible to determine from these measures the actual quality of the DES process that is 
unfolding.   
Finally, after each expositional interview, the interviewers composed a written 
description of each moment of experience. In the present study, subjects were asked to 
read the written descriptions of their moments of experience and rate the accuracy of the 
descriptions on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 representing not at all accurate and 10 
representing completely accurate. The instructions for the rating scale were given to 
subjects verbally and subjects were asked to record their ratings next to each beep 
description. Subjects were also asked to change anything in the written description that 
did not accurately represent their experience. Out of all of the beep summaries reviewed 
by subjects, only 23 revisions were made to the beep summaries by subjects. Overall, the 
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mean beep description rating for the moments of experience discussed in the first 
interview was 9.16 with a SD of 1.35. The mean beep description rating for the moments 
of experience discussed in the second interview was 9.46 with a SD of .97. Lastly, the 
mean beep description rating for the moments of experience discussed in the third 
interview was 9.60 with a SD of .75.  These ratings ultimately suffer from the same 
weakness as the feedback questionnaire and thus, while these high ratings indicate that 
the subject and investigator have a generally well aligned understanding of the moments 
of experience, they in no way ensure that the apprehensions of the moments of 
experience were of high fidelity.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 This study provided a description of the phenomena of inner experience in a 
sample of college students. First we set out to determine if there were any new or 
previously unrecognized phenomena in the subjects’ sampled moments of inner 
experience.  We did not find any.  
Next, we evaluated the inter-rater agreement for coding of seven previously 
identified phenomena of experience (sensory awareness, feeling, unsymbolized thinking, 
inner seeing, inner speech, just doing, and inner hearing) by having three independent 
DES researchers read written descriptions of moments of experience and code those 
experiences for the presence of each phenomenon. We chose these phenomena of 
experience as they have been demonstrated to occur frequently in previous studies 
examining the phenomena of inner experience in college samples (Heavey & Hurlburt), 
We found that the researchers demonstrated significant inter-rater agreement for each 
dimension.  
Our finding of the high inter-rater agreement for the previously identified 
phenomena of experience was consistent with Hurlburt and Heavey (2002). They 
examined the agreement between two DES researchers in identifying the presence of 
phenomena of experience. They had the two DES researchers independently interview 
subjects regarding their inner experience and subsequently identify the phenomena of 
experience present. Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) reported that of the five frequently 
occurring phenomena of experience (images or inner seeing, inner speech, unsymbolized 
thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness), the highest interobserver agreement was 
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demonstrated for images (or inner seeing) whereas the lowest interobserver agreement 
was for sensory awareness. Although we used a different method of evaluating agreement 
in identifying the phenomena of experience, the present study found a similar trend with 
the highest percentage of agreement found for inner seeing and the lowest percentage of 
agreement for sensory awareness followed by inner hearing. The similar results may 
suggest that inner seeing is a phenomenon more easily identified by researchers or 
perhaps subjects are better at capturing and describing inner seeing compared with other 
phenomena. In addition, there may be some aspect to sensory awareness that makes it 
more difficult to identify. For example, Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) suggest that sensory 
awareness may be more difficult to classify because of its relationship to feeling and the 
difficulty in separating bodily sensory awareness (e.g., feeling butterflies in one’s 
stomach) from feelings (e.g., feeling anxious).  
We also evaluated the frequency of the aforementioned previously identified 
phenomena of experience and found that four phenomena (sensory awareness, feeling, 
unsymbolized thinking, and inner seeing) occurred in approximately one-quarter of 
sampled moments.  Inner speech was present in a bit less than 20% of sampled moments 
whereas the remaining two phenomena (just doing, and inner hearing) occurred in 
approximately 10% or fewer of the sampled moments. We also observed significant 
individual differences in the relative frequency of phenomena of inner experience in the 
present study. For example, one subject experienced inner speech in over 90% of her 
moments of experience. In contrast, six subjects experienced no inner speech at all. Such 
individual differences occurred for each phenomena evaluated in this study.  
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The frequencies of previously identified phenomena found within this sample 
were comparable to what was found in a similar sample of college students (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008). This increases our confidence that these phenomena of experience, 
which have now appeared to occur often in two separate studies, are experienced more by 
the general population than other phenomena of inner experience. Additional research is 
needed to substantiate this idea, particularly studies using a sample other than college 
students. It may be beneficial for future studies to identify under which circumstances 
and what types of people do not experience these frequently occurring phenomena. 
Studies are needed to explore the nature of situational variance on inner experience. For 
example, additional research is needed to understand if an individual’s dominant form of 
inner experience remains constant regardless of situational various.  In addition, it may be 
advantageous to understand if there are circumstances or particular types of people for 
whom rarer forms of experience are present more often than what has been observed in 
the present study.  For example, are there mental states (e.g., depressed or anxious) that 
may alter the phenomena of inner experience? 
We found somewhat less inner speech in our sample than what was found in 
Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) sample. We may have found this difference because we 
also independently examined the presence of inner hearing, which is a similar 
phenomenon to inner speech. Since the earlier Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) study, it is 
our impression that DES researchers have become more careful about distinguishing 
between inner speech and inner hearing.  If we add the frequencies of these two 
phenomena, we get a similar frequency as was found in the earlier sample. Also, we may 
have observed different frequencies because Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) selected their 
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sample using a stratified method according to psychological distress as measured by the 
SCL-90. The present study did not use a stratified sampling method but rather used a 
convenience sample. It is possible that the difference in frequencies found were the result 
of differences between the samples with regards to some psychological construct like 
distress. It may also simply reflect fluctuations due to the small size of both samples.  
Further research is needed to understand what influence or relationship psychological 
constructs like distress have to the phenomena of inner experience.  
With regards to the significant individual differences observed in this study, our 
findings were consistent with Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), who also found significant 
individual differences in the frequency of phenomena experienced. It is unclear what 
mediates if one person experiences significantly more of one phenomenon (e.g., inner 
speech) compared to another (e.g., sensory awareness).  Future research focused on 
understanding the pattern of such individual differences will be needed in order to 
interpret the significance, if any, of these large individual differences. 
We also examined the moments of experience to determine if we could identify 
other meaningful dimensions along which inner experience could be characterized. We 
developed three characterizations (the degree to which an experience focuses on future, 
past, or presently occurring phenomena; differentiating between external and internal 
phenomena; and the degree to which inner experience is related to what a subject was 
doing at the moment of the beep) that we ultimately decided were not viable.  Three 
characterizations (richness of experience, valence, and how many experiences present) of 
inner experience, however, were used reliably to characterize the sampled moments. Two 
of these characterizations (richness and number of experiences) were correlated with each 
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other and generally captured the complexity of the ongoing experience.  The third 
characterization, valence, focused on the overall emotional tone of the moment.  
Although valence was rated reliably, it was not related to any of the forms of inner 
experience. Overall, the mean of valence ratings for the sample was close to 0 suggesting 
that we had relatively equal positive and negative ratings of inner experience.  
It should be noted, however, these characterizations are fundamentally different 
than the phenomena usually described in DES. DES research generally examines the 
form of the phenomena of experience. In that sense, a specific phenomenon (e.g., inner 
seeing) is either present or is not within a particular experience. It is something that is 
directly experienced by the subject at the sampled moment.  On the other hand, these 
proposed characterizations provide a description of the degree to which a sampled 
moment represents or contains some underlying (i.e., not directly present in experience) 
characteristic. All moments of experience, regardless of the phenomena present, can be 
rated using these new characterizations.  Additional studies are needed to further evaluate 
the usefulness of these new characterizations. In addition, future studies should continue 
to remain open to finding phenomena or characterizations of experience that have not 
been previously identified. 
 This study also examined the degree to which subjects and interviewers perceive a 
subjects ability to capture and describe one’s experience as well as the interviewer’s 
understanding of a subject’s experience. Overall, the results suggest that subjects and 
interviewers perceive subjects to be improving in their ability to capture and describe 
their experience from the first expositional interview to the last one. Interviewers 
demonstrated significant agreement among themselves regarding subjects’ abilities.  
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Overall, the feedback questionnaires provided limited information regarding the 
quality of subjects’ ability to capture and describe their inner experience and 
interviewers’ understanding of subjects’ inner experiences. While subjects reported 
improvement across the four days of sampling, it is unclear if perceived growth actually 
represents increased skill and furthermore it is impossible to interpret the absolute 
meaning of these ratings of the ability to perform the tasks inherent in DES. Subjects do 
not have a base with which to compare themselves and their ability, so their ratings are 
solely based upon their experiences in attempting these skills during the particular 
interviews they experience. This is similar to a novice basketball player who may think 
he is good at dribbling the ball but does not have any comparison group with whom he 
can compare his level of skill.   
Furthermore, the only feedback a subject receives regarding his skills in capturing 
or describing his experience is within the interview. Usually subjects do not know what 
to expect from the expositional interview until they participate in the first one.  Often, 
subjects leave the first interview with a better understanding of what it means to describe 
their experience at a particular moment. For example, during the first interview often 
novice subjects will experience difficulty narrowing down the moment of the beep. They 
may discuss a minute of their experience surrounding the onset of the beep but DES 
research asks subjects to narrow their experience down to a specific second of 
experience. Some subjects also are surprised at the extent to which they are asked to pay 
attention to the details of their experience. For example, at the first expositional interview 
a subject may report that he/she was thinking of eating an apple. However, DES 
researchers seek additional information regarding how that thought was present to the 
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subject such as whether the thought was present in words (e.g., inner speech) or images 
(e.g., inner seeing).  The low ratings in ability to capture and describe experience seen for 
Day 1 may represent a subject’s lack of familiarity with the questions asked during the 
expositional interview and potential feedback they get from the interviewers rather than a 
pure measure of their abilities.  
It is also important to note that neither the ratings done by the subjects nor the 
researchers’ ratings regarding the perceived ability to capture, describe and understand 
the moments of experience can be used as a reliable guide to the quality or fidelity of the 
process.  As was discussed, the primary information the subject has regarding how well 
he/she is performing the task comes through the exchange during the interview.  Thus if 
the expositional interview was performed by an unskilled researcher, one could easily 
imaging a scenario in which the researcher asks the subject what he or she is 
experiencing, the subject gives a general answer which the researcher accepts and all 
concerned judge the process to be successful.  These participants would likely report 
using such a rating scale that the subject could capture and describe his or her experience 
and the researcher could apprehend it in high fidelity.  Thus we conclude that these types 
of ratings cannot be used as a guide to the quality of the DES process or the fidelity of the 
apprehensions of experience.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 A limitation of this study was that we used a convenience sample of college 
students and did not stratify them according to any meaningful dimensions.  We set out to 
describe the frequency of inner experience in a sample of college students; however, we 
are unable to estimate how representative our sample is of the general college student 
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population. Our convenience sample also makes it difficult to compare our sample with 
other similar college samples as we did not collect much information regarding the 
psychological profiles or general characteristics of our sample. Future research may want 
to use other sampling methods (e.g., stratified method, random sampling, or quota 
sampling) in order to obtain a more representative sample of the general population or to 
stratify the subjects according to their relationship to some characteristic that may be 
related to inner experience.  
In addition, our sample size for this study was small (N = 21) due to the labor and 
time intensive nature of the DES method. For example, this study took approximately one 
academic year to collect data with six DES researchers involved with the collection of the 
data. Our limited sample size provided lower than ideal statistical power for detecting 
relationships and differences.  
 Another potential limitation of the present study was that we did not set out with 
any hypotheses regarding what we expected to find within our sample. Instead, we tried 
to remain unbiased regarding the frequencies, phenomena, and characterizations we 
might have encountered in our sample allowing us to remain open to the possibility of 
finding dimensions of experience not previously encountered.  However, we did examine 
the degree to which our frequencies of phenomena of inner experience were comparable 
to previous studies on inner experience in college students. Some would argue that a 
weakness of the exploratory strategy employed in this study is that we did not directly 
advance any psychological theory or answer any specific theoretical question. Future 
research may want to use the DES method to explicitly address theories regarding the 
nature and frequency of inner experience. 
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 Based on our findings, we believe that future research designed to understand the 
frequency of inner experience in a variety of samples (e.g., non-college student samples, 
those suffering from particular psychological disorders, with some specific external 
characteristics , etc.) would be advantageous in further understanding the nature of inner 
experience. Furthermore, research aimed at understanding the significant individual 
differences we found in this study would be useful.  
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